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Abstract—Fuzzing is a technique of finding bugs by executing a software recurrently with a large number of abnormal inputs.
Most of the existing fuzzers consider all parts of a software equally, and pay too much attention on how to improve the code coverage.
It is inefficient as the vulnerable code only takes a tiny fraction of the entire code. In this paper, we design and implement a
vulnerability-oriented evolutionary fuzzing prototype named V-Fuzz, which aims to find bugs efficiently and quickly in a limited time.
V-Fuzz consists of two main components: a neural network-based vulnerability prediction model and a vulnerability-oriented
evolutionary fuzzer. Given a binary program to V-Fuzz, the vulnerability prediction model will give a prior estimation on which parts of
the software are more likely to be vulnerable. Then, the fuzzer leverages an evolutionary algorithm to generate inputs which tend to
arrive at the vulnerable locations, guided by the vulnerability prediction result. Experimental results demonstrate that V-Fuzz can find
bugs more efficiently than state-of-the-art fuzzers. Moreover, V-Fuzz has discovered 10 CVEs, and 3 of them are newly discovered.
We reported the new CVEs, and they have been confirmed and fixed.
Index Terms—Fuzzing Test, Vulnerability Prediction, Deep Learning, Graph Embedding, Vulnerability-oriented Fuzzing.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing is an automated vulnerability discovery tech-
nique by feeding manipulated random or abnormal inputs
to a software program [1]. With the rapid improvement
of computer performance, fuzzing has been widely used
by software vendors such as Google [7] and Microsoft [8]
for detecting bugs in softwares. However, the efficiency of
fuzzing is still badly in need of being improved, especially
for detecting bugs for large/complex softwares.
It is time-consuming for fuzzers to discover bugs as they
usually work blindly. The blindness of fuzzers is mainly
reflected in the following aspects. First, fuzzers generate
inputs blindly. Usually, the input generation strategies are
based on simple evolutionary algorithms, or even merely
mutate the seed inputs randomly without any feedback in-
formation, especially for blackbox fuzzers. Second, fuzzers
are blind with the fuzzed software especially for blackbox
and greybox fuzzers, i.e., they do not know much infor-
mation about the fuzzed program. Blackbox fuzzers [22]
[6] treat a program as a black box and are unaware of
its internal structure [5]. They simply generate inputs at
random. Thus, discovering a bug is just like looking for a
needle in a haystack, which somewhat relies on luckiness.
Greybox fuzzers are also unaware of the program’s source
codes. They usually do some reverse analyses of binary
programs. However, these analyses are just simple binary
instrumentations, which are mainly used to measure the
code coverage.
Although whitebox fuzzers [26] [27] can perform anal-
ysis on the source code of a program to increase code
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coverage or to reach certain critical program locations,
there are still many problems for whitebox fuzzers to be
applied in fuzzing real programs. Additionally, whitebox
fuzzers still have blindness. They usually leverage symbolic
execution or similar techniques to generate inputs that try
to go through as many paths as possible. Nevertheless,
symbolic execution-based input generation is largely inef-
fective against large programs [37]. For instance, Driller is a
guided whitebox fuzzer that combines AFL [9] with concolic
execution [43]. It was benchmarked with 126 DARPA CGC
[4] binaries, while its concolic engine can only generate
valid inputs for 13 out of 41 binaries. Therefore, it is not
practical to apply symbolic execution to explore meaningful
path especially for the large software. Moreover, as it is hard
to generate enough valid inputs, whitebox fuzzers’ strategy
which blindly pursues high code coverage is not wise and
may waste a lot of time and energy.
As indicated by Sanjay et al. [57], the crux of a fuzzer is
its ability to generate bug triggering inputs. However, most
of the state-of-the-art fuzzers e.g., coverage-based fuzzers
mainly focus on how to improve the code coverage. Intu-
itively, fuzzers with a higher code coverage can potentially
find more bugs. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to treat
all codes of the program as equal. The reasons are as follows.
First, it is difficult to achieve a full code coverage for real
programs. As the size of real programs may be very large,
the generation of inputs to satisfy some sanity checks is
still extremely hard [62]. Second, it needs a mass of time
and computing resources to achieve high code coverage.
Third, the vulnerable code usually takes a tiny fraction of
the entire code. For example, Shin et al. [68] found that
only 3% of the source code files in Mozilla Firefox have
vulnerabilities. Although higher code coverage can enable
a fuzzer to find more bugs, most covered codes may not be
vulnerable. Thus, it is expected to seek a balance between
the fuzzing efficiency and the time cost and computing
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2resources. Therefore, fuzzers should prioritize the codes
which have higher probability of being vulnerable.
Therefore, we develop a vulnerability-oriented fuzzing
framework V-Fuzz for quickly finding more bugs on binary
programs in a limited time. In particular, we mainly focus
on detecting vulnerabilities of binary programs since for
most of the cases, we cannot get access to the source codes
of softwares, especially for the Commercial Off-The-Shelf
(COTS) softwares. Nevertheless, our approach is also suit-
able for the softwares which are open source by compiling
them into binaries. V-Fuzz consists of two components:
a vulnerability prediction model and a vulnerability-oriented
evolutionary fuzzer. The prediction model is built based on
a neural network. Given a binary software, the prediction
model will perform an analysis on which components of
the software are more likely to have vulnerabilities. Then,
the evolutionary fuzzer will leverage the prediction infor-
mation to generate high-quality inputs which tend to arrive
at these potentially vulnerable components. Based on the
above strategies, V-Fuzz reduces the waste of computing
resources and time, and significantly improves the efficiency
of fuzzing. In addition, V-Fuzz still gives relatively small
attention to other parts of the binary program, which have
a lower probability of being vulnerable. Therefore, it can
mitigate the false negative of the vulnerability prediction
model. In summary, our contributions are the followings:
1) We analyze the limitations of existing coverage-based
fuzzers. They usually simply treat all the components of
a program as equal, in hope of achieving a high code
coverage, which is inefficient.
2) To improve fuzzing efficiency, we propose V-Fuzz,
a vulnerability-oriented evolutionary fuzzing prototype. V-
Fuzz significantly improves the fuzzing performance lever-
aging two main strategies: deep learning based vulnerable
component predication and predication information guided
evolutionary fuzzing.
3) To examine the performance of V-Fuzz, we conduct
extensive evaluations leveraging 10 popular Linux applica-
tions and three programs of the popular fuzzing benchmark
LAVA-M. The results demonstrate that V-Fuzz is efficient in
discovering bugs for binary programs. For instance, com-
pared with three state-of-the-art fuzzers (VUzzer, AFL and
AFLfast), V-Fuzz finds the most unique crashes in 24 hours.
Moreover, we discovered 10 CVEs by V-Fuzz, where 3 of
them are newly discovered. We reported the new CVEs, and
they have been confirmed and fixed.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Motivation of V-Fuzz
Fuzzers can be categorized into several types from dif-
ferent perspectives. Based on different input generation
methods, fuzzers can be categorized as generation-based
and mutation-based. A generation-based fuzzer [2] [3] [6]
generates inputs according to the input model designed by
users. A mutation-based fuzzer [9] [10] [11] generates inputs
based on mutating a corpus of seed files during fuzzing. In
this paper, we focus on mutation-based fuzzing.
Based on the exploration strategy, fuzzers can be classi-
fied as directed and coverage-based. A directed fuzzer [21]
[27] [33] [35] [53] generates inputs that aim to arrive at some
1# def ine SIZE 1000
2i n t main ( i n t argc , char * * argv ){
3unsigned char source [ SIZE ] ;
4unsigned char dest [ SIZE ] ;
5char * input=ReadData ( argv [ 1 ] ) ;
6i n t i ;
7i =argv [ 2 ] ;
8/*magic byte check */
9i f ( input [ 0 ] ! = ’ * ’ )
10re turn ERROR;
11i f ( input [1]==0xAB && input [2]==0xCD){
12p r i n t f ( ” Pass 1 s t check !\n” ) ;
13/*some nested condi t ion */
14i f ( strncmp(& input [ 6 ] , ”abcde” , 5 ) ==0){
15p r i n t f ( ” Pass 2nd check !\n” ) ;
16/* some common codes without v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s */
17. . .
18}
19e l s e{
20p r i n t f ( ”Not pass the 2nd check ! ” ) ;
21}
22}
23e l s e{
24p r i n t f ( ”Not pass the 1 s t check ! ” ) ;
25}
26/*A b u f f e r overflow v u l n e r a b i l i t y */
27func v ( input , source , dest ) ;
28re turn 0 ;
29}
Fig. 1: A motivation example.
specific regions. A coverage-based fuzzer [9] [10] [49] [63]
aims to generate inputs that can traverse as many paths as
possible.
Figure 1 shows a highly simplified scenario to describe
our motivation. In this example, there is a function main
and it calls a function func_v in line 27. There are some
magic bytes and error checks in the main function from
line 9 to line 25, some of which are even nested condition
statements. It is known that generating inputs which can
arrive at the check codes is not easy. However, the codes for
these checks do not have any vulnerability. While, in line 27,
the function func_v has a buffer overflow vulnerability.
For the example in Figure 1, most of the state-of-the-
art coverage-based fuzzers do not work well. For instance,
AFL [9] is a security-oriented fuzzer that employs an evo-
lutionary algorithm to generate inputs that can trigger new
internal states in the targeted binary. More specifically, if an
input discovers a new path, this input will be selected as a
seed input. Then, AFL generates new inputs by mutating the
seed inputs. AFL simply regards the input which discovers a
new path as a good input. Once a path is difficult to explore,
AFL gets ”stuck” and chooses another path which is easier
to arrive. In this example, AFL will spend a lot of time trying
to generate inputs that can bypass these checks. However,
AFL will easily get ”stuck”. Finally, AFL may find new paths
or crashes when it arrives at the path at function func_v.
Nevertheless, the previous effort is barely useful in this case.
Another state-of-the-art fuzzer is VUzzer [57], which is an
application-aware evolutionary fuzzer. VUzzer is designed
to pay more attention to generating inputs which can arrive
at deeper paths. For this example, VUzzer will give more
weights to fuzz the codes nested in the condition statements.
However, the codes in deeper paths do not mean that they
have a higher probability to be vulnerable. Therefore, the
fuzzing strategy of VUzzer does not work well either.
For this example, the most important parts of the pro-
3gram that fuzzers should concern first is the function
func_v. If there exists a static analysis tool or vulnerability
detection model which can give a warning information
that func_v may have vulnerabilities, a fuzzer can give
more weights to generating inputs which tend to arrive
at func_v. This will make the fuzzer more efficient in
discovering bugs.
Based on the above discussion, we propose V-Fuzz,
which aims to find bugs quickly in a limited time. V-
Fuzz leverages an evolutionary algorithm to generate inputs
which tend to arrive at vulnerable codes of the program,
assisted by vulnerability prediction information. It needs
to be emphasized that V-Fuzz is neither coverage-based
nor directed. V-Fuzz is different from most coverage-based
fuzzers which regard all codes as equal, since it pays more
attention to the codes which have higher probability to
be vulnerable. In addition, unlike directed fuzzers such as
AFLGo [53], which generates inputs with the objective of
reaching a given set of target program locations, V-Fuzz
gives relatively small weights to other codes which are
unlikely to be vulnerable. This is because the vulnerability
prediction model may not be so accurate, and the compo-
nents that are predicted to be safe may still be vulnerable.
Therefore, V-Fuzz leverages the advantages of vulnerabil-
ity prediction and evolutionary fuzzing, and meanwhile
reduces the disadvantages of them.
2.2 Binary Vulnerability Prediction
In order to implement a vulnerability-oriented fuzzer, a vul-
nerability prediction module is expected, which performs
a pre-analysis of which components are more likely to be
vulnerable. There are two main approaches for vulnerability
prediction. One is using traditional static vulnerability de-
tection methods. The other is leveraging machine learning
or deep learning techniques. Among the two approaches,
we choose to leverage deep learning to build the vulnerabil-
ity prediction model due to the following reasons.
First, most of traditional static analysis methods use
pattern-based approaches to detect vulnerabilities. The pat-
terns are manually defined by security experts, which is
difficult, tedious and time-consuming. For example, there
are many open source vulnerability detection tools such as
ITS4 [23], and commercial tools such as Checkmarx [12].
These tools often have high false positive rates or false
negative rates [65]. In addition, these tools are used to detect
vulnerabilities within source codes. As V-Fuzz focuses on
fuzzing binary programs, these tools are not suitable for V-
Fuzz.
Second, deep learning has been applied to the fields
of defect prediction [38] [47], program analysis [39] [40]
[56] and vulnerability detection [65] successfully. In these
applications, deep learning has several advantages when
compared with pattern-based methods: (1) Deep learning
methods do not need experts to define the features or
patterns, which can reduce lots of overhead. (2) Even for the
same type of vulnerabilities, it is hard to define an accurate
pattern that can describe all forms of it. (3) Pattern-based
methods usually can only detect one specific type vulner-
ability, while deep learning methods have been proven to
be able to detect several types of vulnerabilities simultane-
ously [65]. Therefore, we choose to leverage deep learning
methods to build our vulnerability prediction model.
Moreover, it is worth to note that there has been no
such approach that leverages deep learning to detect or
predict vulnerabilities for binary programs to the best of our
knowledge. In order to build our prediction model, there are
several questions that need to be considered.
How to represent a binary program? It is inappropriate
to analyze binary codes directly, as the binary itself does not
have sufficient syntactic or semantic information. Therefore,
the binary needs to be transformed into some intermedi-
ate form such as assembly language, which has enough
meaningful characteristic information. Following this idea,
we choose to analyze the Control Flow Graph (CFG) of a
binary program, as the CFG contains rich semantic and
structural information. In addition, in order to conveniently
train a deep learning model, the binary program needs to
be represented as numerical vectors. Therefore, we leverage
the Attributed Control Flow Graph (ACFG) [42] to describe and
represent a binary program with numerical vectors.
Which granularity is suitable for analysis? The granu-
larity is also an important factor that needs to be considered.
The possible granularity of a binary program can be file,
function, basic block, etc. In fact, a proper granularity cannot
be too coarse or too fine, as the too coarse granularity
will decrease the precision of the model, while the too fine
granularity will make it hard to collect sufficient labeled
data for training a meaningful model. Therefore, we seek a
tradeoff and choose function as the granularity to analyze.
Which neural network model is appropriate for the
vulnerability prediction problem? One important advan-
tage of neural networks is that it can learn features auto-
matically. Since we leverage ACFG to represent a binary
program, we leverage graph embedding network [44] to
build our model as it has been successfully applied to
extract valid features of structural data. Moreover, Xu et al.
[56] applied this approach to detect similar cross-platform
binary codes. Therefore, it could be feasible to leverage this
model to predict the vulnerable components of a program.
As the aim of our model is not detecting similar codes, it is
necessary to change the graph embedding network to make
it suitable for our problem. The detailed description will be
presented later.
3 V-FUZZ: SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we introduce the main components and
workflow of V-Fuzz. Figure 2 shows the architecture of V-
Fuzz, which consists of two modules: a Neural Network-based
Vulnerability Prediction Model and a Vulnerability-Oriented
Evolutionary Fuzzer.
Neural Network-based Vulnerability Prediction
Model. For a binary program, the vulnerability prediction
model will give a prediction on which components are more
likely to be vulnerable. More specifically, the component
is a function of a binary program, and the prediction is
the probability of a function being vulnerable. We leverage
deep learning to build this model, and the core structure
of the model is a graph embedding network. The detailed
structure of the model is shown in Section 4. In order
to enable the model to predict vulnerabilities, we train
4Fig. 2: The architecture of V-Fuzz.
the model with a number of labeled data (the label is
”vulnerable” or ”secure”). In addition, the model is able to
predict several types of vulnerabilities when it is trained
with sufficient data related to these vulnerabilities. Then,
the prediction result will be sent to the fuzzer to assist it in
finding bugs.
Vulnerability-Oriented Evolutionary Fuzzer. Based on
the previous vulnerability prediction result, the fuzzer will
assign more weight to the functions that have higher vulner-
able probabilities. For convenience, we use the ”vulnerable
probability” to represent the ”the probability of being vul-
nerable” in this paper. The process is as follows: for each
function of the binary program with a vulnerable probabil-
ity, V-Fuzz will give each basic block in the function a Static
Vulnerable Score (SVS), which represents the importance of
the basic block. The detailed scoring method is described in
Section 5. Then, V-Fuzz starts to fuzz the program with some
initial inputs provided by users. It leverages an evolutionary
algorithm to generate proper inputs. For each executed
input, V-Fuzz gives a fitness score for it, which is the sum
of the SVS of all the basic blocks that are on its execution
path. Then, the inputs that have higher fitness scores or cause
crashes will be selected as new seed inputs. Finally, new
inputs will be continuously generated by mutating the seed
inputs. In this way, V-Fuzz tends to generate inputs that are
more likely to arrive at the vulnerable regions.
4 VULNERABILITY PREDICTION
4.1 Problem Formalization
In this subsection, we formalize the vulnerability prediction
problem. We denote the vulnerability prediction model as
M . Given a binary program pˆ, suppose it has τ functions
F = {f1, f2, ..., fτ}. For any function fi ∈ F , it is an
input of M , and the corresponding output PVfi denotes
the vulnerable probability of fi, i.e.,
PVfi =M(fi). (1)
The function that has a high vulnerable probability
should be paid more attention when fuzzing the program.
In order to build such an M , there are three aspects to be
considered: the representation of input data, i.e., the approach
of data preprocess, the model structure and how to train and use
the model. We will introduce the details of the three aspects
below.
Fig. 3: The Workflow of data preprocessing.
4.2 Data Preprocessing
As discussed in Section 2, to build and train M , we should
seek a method to transform binary program functions into
numerical vectors. Moreover, the vectors should be able
to carry enough information for future training. Towards
this, we choose to leverage the Attributed Control Flow Graph
(ACFG) [42] to represent the binary function.
ACFG is a directed graph g =< V,E, φ >, where V is
the set of vertices, E is the set of edges, and φ is a mapping
function. In ACFG, a vertex represents a basic block, an edge
represents the connection between two basic blocks, and φ :
V →∑ maps a basic block in g to a set of attributes∑.
As we know, it is common to use Control Flow Graph
(CFG) to find bugs [41] [46]. However, CFG is not a numer-
ical vector, which means it cannot be used to train a deep
learning model directly. Fortunately, ACFG is another form
of CFG by describing CFG with a number of basic-block
level attributes. In ACFG, each basic block is represented
by a numerical vector, where each dimension of the vector
denotes the value of a specific attribute. In this way, the
whole binary function can be represented as a set of vectors.
Therefore, ACFG is suitable for our requirements to repre-
sent a binary function.
Now, we show how to vectorize a binary program.
Figure 3 shows the workflow of data preprocessing. First,
we disassemble the binary program to get the CFGs of its
functions. Then, we extract attributes for basic blocks and
transform each basic block into a numerical vector. The
attributes are used to characterize a basic block, and they
can be statistical, semantic and structural. Here, we only
extract the statistical attributes for the following reasons.
The first reason is for efficiency. As indicated in [42], the
cost of extracting semantic features such as I/O pairs of
basic blocks is too expensive. Second, the graph embedding
network can learn the structural attributes automatically.
We extract 255 attributes in total. Table 1 shows all the 255
attributes, and all the instruction type-related attributes can
be found in Section 5.1 of [20].
There are mainly three kinds of attributes: instruction-
related attributes, operand-related attributes and string-
related attributes. Then, each basic block can be represented
by a 255-dimensional vector, and the binary program now
is represented by a set of 255-dimensional vectors.
4.3 Model Structure
Based on the discussion in Section 2, we choose to adapt
Graph Embedding Network [44] [56] as the core of our vulner-
5TABLE 1: The used attributes of basic blocks.
Type Attributes Num
Instructions The num of call instruction 244
Operand
The num of void operand
8
The num of general register operand
The num of direct memory reference operand
The num of operand that consists of a base register or an index register
The num of operand that consists of registers and displacement value
The num of immediate operand
The num of operand that is accessing immediate far addresses
The num of operand that is accessing immediate near addresses
Other
The num of string ”malloc”
3The num of string ”calloc”
The num of string ”free”
All attributes num 255
Fig. 4: The Structure of the vulnerability prediction model. p
is the output of the model, which represents the vulnerable
probability of a binary function.
ability prediction model. Firstly, we give a brief introduction
of the graph embedding network. Then, we detail the design
of our model.
Graph embedding is an efficient approach to solve
graph-related problems [67] such as node classification,
recommendation and so on. It transforms a graph into an
embedding vector that contains sufficient information of the
graph for solving corresponding problems. In our scenario,
the embedding vectors of a binary function should be able
to contain sufficient features for vulnerability prediction. In
addition, graph embedding can be considered as a mapping
λ, which maps a function’s ACFG g into a vector λ(g).
We leverage a neural network to approximate the map-
ping λ, and train the model with vulnerable and secure
binary functions to enable the graph embedding network to
learn the features related to vulnerabilities. As the vulnera-
bility prediction model is required to output the vulnerable
probability of a binary function, we combine the graph em-
bedding network with a pooling layer and a softmax-layer.
The pooling layer transforms the embedding vector into a
TABLE 2: Notations.
Notation Meaning
a The number of attributes of a basic block
g The ACFG of a binary function
V The set of vertices
E The set of edges
v a vertex in V
xv The attributed vector of vertex v
d The dimension of an embedding vector
µv The embedding vector of vertex v
µg The graph embedding vector of ACFG g
2-dimensional vector Z , and the softmax-layer maps the 2-
dimension vector Z of arbitrary real values into another 2-
dimension vector Q, where the value of each dimension is
in the range [0, 1]. The first dimension represents the vul-
nerable probability, which is represented by p. The second
dimension represents the secure probability, and naturally
the value is 1 − p. The whole model is trained by labeled
data end-to-end, and the parameters of the model can be
learned by minimizing a loss function.
Below is the formalization of the model. Table 2 shows
all the notations related to the model. and the structure of
the model is presented in Figure 4. The input of the model is
the ACFG g of a binary program function, g =< V,E, φ >.
Each basic block v ∈ V in ACFG has an attribute vector xv
which can be constructed according to all selected attributes.
The number of attributes for each basic block is a. Thus,
xv is an a-dimensional vector. For each basic block v, the
graph embedding network computes an embedding vector
µv , which combines the topology information of the graph.
The dimension of the embedding vector µv is d. Let Nv
be the set of neighboring vertices of v. Since ACFG is a
directed graph, Nv can be considered as the set of precursor
vertices of v. Then the embedding vector µv can be com-
puted by µv = F (xv,
∑
j∈Nv (µj)), where F is a non-linear
function that can be tanh, sigmoid etc. The embedding
vector µv is computed for T iterations. For each iteration
t, the temp embedding vector can be get by equation µ(t)v =
F (W1xv+σ(
∑
j∈Nv (µj)
(t−1))), where xv is an a×1 vector,
and W1 is a d× a matrix. The initial embedding vector µ(0)v
is set to zero. After T iterations, ∀v ∈ V , we obtain the final
graph embedding vector µTv . σ is a n-layer fully-connected
6neural network with parameters P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}. Let
ReLU(·) = max{0, ·} be a rectified linear unit. We have
σ(x) = P1ReLU(P2...ReLU(Pn(x))). After T iterations, we
can get the final graph embedding vector µTv for each vertex
v ∈ V . Then the graph embedding vector µg of the ACFG
g can be represented by the summation of the embedding
vector of each basic block, i.e., µg =W2(
∑
v∈V (µ
T
v )), where
W2 is a d× d matrix. To compute the vulnerable probability
of the function, we map the graph embedding vector into a
2-dimensional vector Z = {z0, z1}, i.e.,
Z =W3µg, (2)
where W3 is a 2×d matrix. Then, we use a softmax function
to map the values of Z into the vector Q = {p, 1− p}, p ∈
[0, 1], i.e.,
Q = Softmax(Z) (3)
The value of p is the output of the model, which rep-
resents the vulnerable probability of the binary program
function g.
4.4 Train and Use the Model
In order to predict the vulnerable probability, the model
needs be trained with labeled data, where the label is either
”vulnerable” or ”secure”. For the ACFG g of a function, the
label l of g is 0 or 1, where l = 0 means the function has
at least one vulnerability, and l = 1 means the function is
secure.
The model’s training process is similar to a classification
model. Then the parameters of M can be learned by opti-
mizing the following equation:
min
W1,W2,W3,...,P1,P2,...,Pn
m∑
i=1
(H(Q, l)), (4)
where m is the number of training data, and H is a cross-
entropy loss function. We optimize Equation (4) with a
stochastic gradient descent method. Thus, the vulnerability
prediction model can be trained in this way.
Although the model’s training process is similar to
training a classification model, when using the model, the
classification result that whether a binary function is vul-
nerable or not is too coarse-grained and not suitable for
the subsequent fuzzing. Therefore, we choose to use the
vulnerable probability p as the output of the model.
5 VULNERABILITY-ORIENTED FUZZING
Based on the result from the prediction model, the
vulnerability-oriented fuzzer will pay more attention to the
functions with high probabilities. Figure 5 shows the work-
flow of vulnerability-oriented fuzzing, where V-Fuzz lever-
ages an evolutionary algorithm to generate inputs which
tend to arrive at the vulnerable components. Specifically, for
a binary program, V-Fuzz uses the data process module to
disassemble the binary to get the ACFG of each function,
which is the input of the vulnerability prediction model.
Then, the prediction model will give each binary program
function a Vulnerability Prediction (VP). Based on the VP
result, each basic block in the program is given a Static
Vulnerable Score (SVS), which will be used later to evaluate
the executed test cases.
Fig. 5: Vulnerability-Oriented Fuzzing. DBI: Dynamic Binary
Instrumentation, SVS: Static Vulnerable Score, and VP: Vul-
nerability Prediction.
The fuzzing test is a cyclic process. Like most mutation-
based evolutionary fuzzers, V-Fuzz maintains a seed pool,
which is used to save high-quality inputs as seeds. V-Fuzz
starts to execute the binary program with some initial inputs
that are provided by users. Meanwhile, it uses Dynamic Bi-
nary Instrumentation (DBI) to track the execution information
of the program such as basic block coverage. Based on SVS
and the execution information, V-Fuzz will calculate a fitness
score for each executed testcase. The testcases with high
fitness scores are considered as high-quality inputs, and will
be sent to the seed pool. In addition, the executed testcases
which trigger crashes will also be sent to the seed pool,
regardless of their fitness scores. The detailed method for
calculating fitness score will be given in Section 5.2. Next,
V-Fuzz generates the next generation testcases by mutating
the seeds in the seed pool. In this way, V-Fuzz continues to
execute the program with new generated inputs until the
end conditions are met. Below, we elaborate the workflow
of vulnerability-oriented fuzzing.
5.1 Static Vulnerable Score
Based on the VP result, V-Fuzz gives each basic block a
Static Vulnerable Score (SVS). For a function f , we assume
its vulnerable probability is pv , and it has ι basic blocks
f = b1, b2, ..., bι. For bi ∈ f , bi’s SVS, denoted by SV S(bi),
can be calculated by the following equation:
SV S(bi) = κ ∗ pv + ω, (5)
where κ and ω are constant parameters that should be
obtained from fuzzing experiments. Hence, the basic blocks
that belong to the same function have the same SV S values.
For parameter κ, we fuzz 64 Linux programs (e.g., some
programs in binutils), and 20 of them have crashes. Then,
we fuzz these 20 programs individually with the value of
κ ∈ [10, 100], and we observe that when κ ∈ [15, 25], the
fuzzing test performs the best. Therefore, we set κ = 20
as the default value. For parameter ω, it is used to avoid
SV S = 0 when functions have very low vulnerable prob-
abilities . As if SV S(bi) = 0, it represents that bi has no
meaning for fuzzing and becomes trivial, which is against
our design principle of V-Fuzz. Therefore, we set the value
7of ω = 0.1, which is small and can make SV S > 0 all the
time.
Based on the approach of calculating SV S, V-Fuzz as-
signs more weight to the basic blocks that are more likely
to be vulnerable, which will further assist the fuzzer to
generate inputs that are more likely to cover the basic blocks.
5.2 Seed Selection Strategy
Algorithm 1 shows the seed selection strategy of V-Fuzz.
Specifically, V-Fuzz leverages an evolutionary algorithm to
select seeds which are more likely to arrive at the vulnerable
components.
After giving every basic block a SV S, V-Fuzz enters
the fuzzing loop. During each loop, V-Fuzz monitors the
program to check if it has exceptions such as crashes. If the
input causes a crash, then the input is added to the seed
pool. Once an execution has completed, V-Fuzz records the
execution path for the input. The fitness score of the input is
the sum of the SVS values of the basic blocks that are on the
execution path. Figure 6 shows an example for fitness score
calculation. We assume there are two inputs i1, i2 in this
generation. The execution paths of the two inputs are path1
and path2 respectively. Suppose path1 is b1 → b2 → b4, and
path2 is b1 → b3 → b6 → b8. The fitness score of input i1 and
i2 are f1 and f2 respectively. Then, f1 = 2 + 5 + 8 = 15,
f2 = 2 + 1 + 1 + 2 = 6. As f1 is larger than f2, the input
i1 will be selected as a seed. It should be noted that, if any
input causes a crash, no matter how low the fitness score it
has, it will be sent to the seed pool.
In this way, V-Fuzz not only utilizes the information of
the vulnerability prediction model, but also considers the
actual situation. Therefore, V-Fuzz can mitigate the potential
weakness of the vulnerability prediction model.
Algorithm 1 Seed Selection Algorithm
Require: Binary Program: p; The set of all basic blocks of p: B;
The set of initial inputs: I ; The set of seed pool: S; The set of
testcases: T ;
T = I
while In the fuzzing loop do
for t in T do
Path,Ret = EXE(p, t)
fitness(t) =
∑
b∈Path(SV S(b))
if Ret(i) ∈ CRASH then
S.add(t)
end if
end for
Q = SelectKfitness(I)
S.add(Q)
T =Mutate(S)
end while
5.3 Mutation Strategy
V-Fuzz is a mutation-based evolutionary fuzzing system,
which generates new inputs by mutating the seeds. Like
most of mutation-based fuzzers, the mutation operations are
bit/byte flips, inserting ”interesting” bits/bytes, changing
some bits/bytes, selecting some bytes from several seeds
and splicing them together and so on.
The design of the mutation strategy is very important, as
an appropriate strategy can help the fuzzer generate good
Fig. 6: An example for fitness score calculation.
inputs which can find new paths or crashes. For example,
Figure 7 gives the CFG of a simple program. Assume that
there is a seed string s1 = “abx”, which can cover the basic
block b1, b2. Another seed string s2 = “qwerty” covers no
basic block of the program. It is obvious that the new inputs
mutated from s1 are more likely to cover new basic blocks
than those mutated from s2.
It is worth noting that if we want to get ”ab*” by
mutating ”abx”, the mutation must be slight, which only
changes a small part of the original seed. However, if the
fuzzer has spent too much time doing the slight mutation
operations, while making no progress, the fuzzer should
change its mutation strategy and pay more attention to other
paths. In this example, if the fuzzer gets ”stuck” for a long
time by performing the slight mutation on ”abx”, it would
be better to choose heavy mutation that changes more about
the original seed, which may help the fuzzer find the basic
block b3. Therefore, the fuzzer should dynamically adjust its
mutation strategy according to the actual fuzzing states.
We classify the mutation strategies into slight mutation
and heavy mutation. In order to help the fuzzer determine
the selection of the mutation strategy, we define Crash Win-
dow (CW), which is a threshold to determine the selection
of mutation strategy. Consequently, we assume that the
number of generations whose inputs have not found any
new path or crash is denoted by notation ζ . If ζ > CW , the
fuzzer should select heavy mutation strategy. Furthermore,
we propose the Crash Window Jump Algorithm to adjust the
value of CW optimally.
The main idea of the Crash Window Jump Algorithm is
as follows: First, we assume that the initial value of CW is
ini cw, its maximum value is max cw and its minimum
value is min cw. The value of CW starts from ini cw, and
the fuzzer selects slight mutation as its initial mutation
strategy. During the fuzzing process, if ζ > CW , the fuzzer
will change its mutation strategy to heavy mutation, and
will double the value of CW. Once an input finds a new
path or a crash, then we set ζ = 0 and the new value of
CW as the half of its former value. Algorithm 2 shows the
pseudo-code of the Crash Window Jump Algorithm.
8Algorithm 2 Crash Window Jump Algorithm
Require: Binary Program: p; The initial crash window: ini cw;
Max Crash Window: max cw; Min Crash Window: min cw;
The current Crash Window: CW ; The set of seed pool: S; The
set of testcases: T ; The mutation strategy: MS; no crash =
True; no new bb = True;
CW = ini cw
T = I
ζ = 0
MS = slight mutate
while In the fuzzing loop do
for t in T do
EXE(p, t)
if find crash then
no crash = False
end if
if find new basic block then
no new bb = False
end if
end for
if no crash == True&&no new bb == True then
ζ ++
if ζ > CW then
MS = heavy mutate
if CW >= min cw × 2 then
CW = CW/2
end if
end if
else
ζ = 0
MS = slight mutate
if CW <= max cw/2 then
CW = CW × 2
end if
end if
S = select good seed(T )
T =MS(S)
end while
Fig. 7: A simple CFG.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND SETTINGS
6.1 Vulnerability Prediction
The vulnerability prediction module consists of two main
components: the ACFG extractor and the vulnerability pre-
diction model. For the ACFG extractor, we implement it by
writing a plug-in on the famous disassembly tool IDA Pro
[14]. For the vulnerability prediction model, we implement
it based on PyTorch [15], which is a popular deep learning
framework.
We train the vulnerability prediction model on a server
which is equipped with two Intel Xeon E5-2640v4 CPUs
(40 cores in total) running at 2.40GHz, 4 TB HDD, 64 GB
memory, and one GeForce GTX 1080 TI GPU card.
6.2 Vulnerability-Oriented Fuzzing
For vulnerability-oriented fuzzing, we implement the fuzzer
based on VUzzer [57], an application-aware evolutionary
fuzzer which focuses on fuzzing binary programs.
We conduct the fuzzing test on a virtual machine with
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. The virtual machine is configured with
32-bit single core 4.2GHz Intel CPU and 4 GB RAM, During
the fuzzing test, we observe that the fuzzing process takes
less than 1GB of memory.
7 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of V-Fuzz. Since
V-Fuzz consists of two components, we will present the
evaluation results in two parts: the vulnerability prediction
and the vulnerability-oriented fuzzing.
7.1 Vulnerability Prediction Evaluation
7.1.1 Data Selection
The dataset used for training and testing the vulnerability
prediction model is published by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) [13], as this dataset has
been widely used in many vulnerability related work [65]
[69]. We use the codes of Juliet Test Suite v1.3 [16] as our
training and testing data, which is a collection of test cases
in the C/C++ language, and each function in this dataset
is labeled with ”good” or ”bad”. A function labeled with
”good” means it does not have flaws, while one labeled with
”bad” means it has at least one flaw. Each ”bad” example
has a Common Weakness Enumeration IDentifier (CWE ID).
Juliet Test Suite v1.3 has examples of 118 different CWEs in
total. As fuzzing is suitable for discovering bugs related to
memory, we select some CWE samples which are related to
memory errors from Juliet Test Suite v1.3, which are shown
in Table 3.
As Table 3 shows, we collect 111,540 labeled function
samples in total, which include 78,511 secure samples and
33,029 vulnerable samples. The top three types of CWEs are
Integer Overflow (the number is 26,982 ), Heap Based
Buffer Overflow (the number is 18,522) and Stack
Based Buffer Overflow (the number is 15,403). These
CWE testcases take almost half of all the data (54.6%).
In addition, these 3 types of vulnerabilities are the most
common ones in real-world. Thus, the distribution of our
selected datasets is similar as the distribution of real-world
vulnerabilities.
From Table 3, we randomly select 40,000 samples as the
training data TRAIN-DATA. Then, we again randomly select
4,000 samples as the testing data TEST-DATA, which has no
overlap with TRAIN-DATA. Table 4 presents the information
of the 3 datasets.
7.1.2 Pre Experiments
First, we conduct some pre-training experiments to deter-
mine the default parameters of the model. We use stochastic
gradient descent as the optimization algorithm and set the
9TABLE 3: The Types of CWE.
CWE Type #Secure #Vulnerable Total
121 Stack Based Buffer Overflow 10,187 5,216 15,403
122 Heap Based Buffer Overflow 12,263 6,259 18,522
124 Buffer Under write 4,183 2,031 6,214
126 Buffer Over Read 3,019 1,376 4,395
127 Buffer Under Read 4,183 2,031 6,214
134 Uncontrolled Format String 6,833 2,357 9,190
190 Integer Overflow 20,187 6,795 26,982
401 Memory Leak 6,756 2,303 9,059
415 Double Free 4,204 1,448 5,652
416 Use After Free 1,760 470 2,230
590 Free Memory Not On The Heap 4,049 2,250 6,299
761 Free Pointer Not At Start 887 493 1,380
Total 78,511 33,029 111,540
TABLE 4: Datasets.
Dataset #Vulnerable #Secure Total Remarks
ALL-DATA 78,511 33,029 111,540 All data in Table 2
TRAIN-DATA 20,000 20,000 40,000 Selected from ALL-DATA
TEST-DATA 2,000 2,000 4,000 Selected from ALL-DATA
learning rate equal to 0.0001. Based on the results of the pre-
training experiments, we set the depth of the network as 5,
the embedding size as 256, and the number of iterations as 3.
We take the above setting as the default of our model. Then,
we use TRAIN-DATA to train the vulnerability prediction
model, and use TEST-DATA to test the model.
7.1.3 Evaluation Metrics
We use three metrics to evaluate the performance of the
model: accuracy, recall and loss. The first two metrics reflect
the model’s capability of predicting vulnerable functions.
Additionally, we evaluate whether the model converges by
observing the value of loss. Next, we show the method to
calculate these three metrics and show the performance of
the model using these metrics.
Suppose the number of testing samples is Lˆ. Among
these samples, the number of samples labeled as ”vulner-
able” is Vˆ , and the number of samples labeled as ”secure”
is Lˆ−Vˆ . Based on the prediction outputs, we sort the testing
examples in descending order of their predicted values (i.e.,
vulnerable probability). Then, we select the top-K testing
samples. Assuming among the top-K samples, the number
of samples labeled as ”vulnerable” is vˆ, and the number of
samples labeled as ”secure” is K− vˆ. Thus, we can calculate
the accuracy of the top-K testing data as accuracy = vˆ/K.
When the threshold K equals to the number of Vˆ , we can
calculate the recall as recall = vˆ/Vˆ , (K = Vˆ ). Finally, we
leverage the cross-entropy loss function to calculate loss.
Figure 8 shows the performance of the model evaluated
by the three metrics. Figure 8a presents the prediction
accuracy when setting the threshold K to different values
(in range [200, 1000]), from which we can observe that the
accuracy of the model is high (greater than 80%). Figure
8b presents the prediction recall. From the figure, we can
observe that the prediction recall rises from 53% to 66%
during the training process. Its value increases very soon
and becomes stable within 10 training epochs. Figure 8c
presents the value of loss, from which we can observe
that its value drops very quickly in the first 6 epochs, and
remains stable after that.
From the above results, we can see that this model is
capable for vulnerable function prediction.
7.1.4 Hyperparameters Analysis
In this part, we give an analysis on the hyperparameters.
They are the number of depth, embedding size and the
number of iterations. Figure 9 shows the impact of different
hyperparameters. We select the accuracy of top-K (K=600) as
the impact indicator to show the effectiveness of different
hyperparameters.
Embedding Size: Figure 9a shows the impact of different
embedding size. Here, we test the impact by setting the
embedding size as 128, 256, 512 and 1024 respectively. From
the figure, we can observe that when the embedding size is
1024, the accuracy reaches the largest, and the accuracy of
other embedding size is almost the same. However, as the
overhead will be increased when using a large embedding
size, to balance the overhead and performance, we choose
to select the embedding size as 256 instead of 1024.
Depth: Figure 9b shows the impact of different depth.
Here, we test the depth at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. From the
figure, we can observe that when the depth is 8, the accuracy
reaches the largest. However, the accuracy does not have a
strictly positive correlation with the number of depth. For
instance, the accuracy is the lowest when the depth is 6.
Since training a neural network model with more layers
may take more time and computing resource, we choose
to set the depth of our model as 5, which also has a high
accuracy.
Iterations: The number of iterations T means that the
embedding vectors of one vertex contains the information of
its T-hop neighborhood vertices. Figure 9c shows the impact
of different iterations. We test the model with T ∈ [3, 7].
From the figure, we can observe that when T = 3, the
accuracy is the highest. We conjecture the reason may be
that the size of our test samples is not very big. For a basic
block, the information of its 3-hop neighborhoods is enough
for the model to learn the features of the graph. Therefore,
we choose to set T = 3 in our model. It is worth noting
that the number of iterations can be adjusted to make it
appropriate for specific training or testing datasets.
7.1.5 Efficiency
We evaluate the efficiency of the vulnerability prediction
from two aspects: (1) ACFG extraction time and (2) training
time with different model structures.
ACFG Extraction Time. We evaluate the ACFG extraction
time from two aspects: the number of functions in a binary
and the size of the binary. We collect a lot of binaries samples
and test the ACFG extraction time of them. Figure 10 shows
the ACFG extraction time with different number of functions
and file sizes. Moreover, we test the debugging binaries
and the released binaries respectively. From the figure, we
have the following observations. (1) The extraction time of
debugging binaries is much less than the released binaries.
Since the debugging binaries have more information such
as symbolic tables, which can help improve the speed of
disassemble analysis, while the released binaries don not
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Fig. 8: The performance of the model.
(a) Accuracy of different embedding size d. (b) Accuracy of different depth n. (c) Accuracy of different iteration T .
Fig. 9: Impact of different hyperparameters.
(a) The number of functions. (b) File Size.
Fig. 10: ACFG extraction time.
have so much information and may cost more time to do the
disassemble analysis. (2) The extraction time has a positive
linear correlation with the number of functions. (3) The
extraction time has a positive linear correlation with the
value of file size. (4) The ACFG extraction time is pretty
short. For most of the debugging binaries, the extraction
time is within 2.5 seconds. For most of the released binaries,
the extraction time is within 100 seconds. Thus, we can
extract the ACFG of a binary program efficiently.
Training Time. Figure 11 shows the training time with
different parameters. For this model, the parameters which
affect the training time much are depth and embedding
size. From this figure, we can observe that training time
has a positive correlation with both the depth and the
embedding size. Table 5 presents the statistical results of the
training time for 50 training epochs with different depth and
embedding size. From the table, we can see that the average
TABLE 5: The training time with different parameters.
Depth Embedding Size Training Time(min)50 epochs average for 1 epoch
3
128 907.70 18.15
256 909.14 18.18
512 934.99 18.69
4
128 984.99 19.69
256 988.98 19.77
512 1,009.09 20.18
5
128 1,010.24 20.20
256 1,013.58 20.27
512 1,049.14 20.98
time for training the model in 1 epoch is about 20 minutes.
As the model can converge within 10 epochs, we only need
about 200 minutes to train a valid vulnerability prediction
model, which is significantly more efficient. In addition, as
the vulnerability prediction model can be trained offline, it
does not affect the time overhead of fuzzing.
7.2 The Evaluation of Fuzzing
In this section, we evaluate the performance of V-Fuzz
in fuzzing test. Towards this, we conduct a number of
fuzzing test on 13 different applications as shown in Table
6. These applications are popular real-world open source
Linux applications and fuzzing benchmarks. The real-world
Linux applications includes the audio processing softwares
(e.g., MP3GAIN), pdf transformation tools (e.g., pdftotext)
and XPS documents library (e.g, libgxps). The fuzzing
benchmarks are three programs (uniq, base64 and who)
of LAVA-M [45]. The reasons for selecting these applications
are as follows: (1) The selected real-world Linux applications
are very popular and have been used widely. (2) As these ap-
plications are open source. the security of these applications
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Fig. 11: Training time with different model parameters:
depth n and embedding size d.
may have significant impacts on other applications that are
developed based on them. (3) LAVA-M [45] is a famous
benchmark for evaluating the performance of vulnerability
detection tools. Many the advanced fuzzing studies test
their tools [57] [63] [64] with the programs of LAVA-M (a
set of programs in LAVA-M). Even more, we compare V-
Fuzz with several state-of-the-art fuzzers: VUzzer [57] AFL
[9] and AFLFast [48].
It should be emphasized that all of the fuzzing experi-
ments are conducted based on the following principles: (1)
All the running environments are the same. Every single
fuzzing test is conducted on a virtual machine equipped
with 32-bit single core 4.2 GHz Intel CPU and 4 GB RAM,
on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system. (2) All the initial inputs for
fuzzing are same. (3) The running time of all the fuzzing
evaluation is the same. Therefore, all the fuzzing experi-
ments are fair and convincing.
There are two main aspects to evaluate a fuzzer’s capa-
bility of finding bugs: unique crashes, and identified vulnerabil-
ities. We will demonstrate the performance of V-Fuzz from
the two aspects firstly. Moreover, we will evaluate the code
coverage.
7.2.1 Unique Crashes
The capability of finding unique crashes is an important fac-
tor to evaluate a fuzzer’s performance. Although a unique
crash is not necessarily a vulnerability, in most cases, if a
fuzzer can find more crashes, it can find more vulnerabil-
ities. More specifically, a fuzzer with a better capability of
finding unique crashes usually has the following character-
istics: (1) In a limited time, it can find more unique crashes.
(2) For finding a fixed number of unique crashes, it can find
them fast.
Thus, we will demonstrate V-Fuzz’s performance in
finding unique crashes by answering the following two
questions.
Whether V-Fuzz can find more unique crashes in a
limited time? We fuzz the 13 programs for 24 hours and
compare V-Fuzz with 3 state-of-the-arts fuzzers: VUzzer,
AFL and AFLFast. In detail, Table 6 presents the information
TABLE 6: The number of unique crashes found for 24 hours.
Application Version FuzzerV-Fuzz VUzzer AFL AFLFast
uniq LAVA-M 659 321 0 0
base64 LAVA-M 128 100 0 0
who LAVA-M 117 92 0 0
pdftotext xpdf-2.00 209 59 12 108
pdffonts xpdf-2.00 581 367 13 0
pdftopbm xpdf-2.00 50 25 37 35
pdf2svg + libpoppler pdf2svg-0.2.3 3 2 0 1libpoppler-0.24.5
MP3Gain 1.5.2 217 34 103 110
mpg321 0.3.2 321 184 40 17
xpstopng libgxps-0.2.5 3,222 2,195 2 2
xpstops libgxps-0.2.5 4,157 3,044 3 3
xpstojpeg libgxps-0.2.5 4,828 4,243 4 4
cflow 1.5 1 0 0 0
Total 14,493 10,666 214 280
Average 1,114 820 16 21
of the fuzzed programs and the number of unique crashes
found in 24 hours. From Table 6, we have the following
observations. (1) For all the 13 programs, V-Fuzz find the
most unique crashes (the average number of unique crashes
for one program is 1,114) and is much better than the
other three fuzzers. (2) Compared with VUzzer, the average
number of unique crashes found by V-Fuzz is improved by
35.8%. In addition, for the program cflow, VUzzer did not
find any crash while V-Fuzz found one crash. (3) Compared
with AFL, there are five programs (uniq, base64, who,
pdf2svg and cflow), on which AFL has did not find any
crash while V-Fuzz had a good performance. (4) Compared
with AFLFast, there are also five programs (uniq, base64,
who, pdffonts and cflow), on which AFLFast did not find
any crash while V-Fuzz did.
Whether V-Fuzz can find unique crashes quickly? Fig-
ure 12 shows the growth curves of the number of discovered
unique crashes within 24 hours. From the figure, we can
observe that V-Fuzz finds unique crashes more quickly than
other state-of-the-art fuzzers. From the above results, we can
see that V-Fuzz has good performance in discovering unique
crashes and outperforms state-of-the-art fuzzers.
7.2.2 Vulnerability Discovery
In this part, we show V-Fuzz’s capability of discovering
vulnerabilities. During the fuzzing test of V-Fuzz, we collect
the inputs which cause crashes. For the three programs of
LAVA-M, we run the programs again with the crash inputs,
and verify the bugs they found. Table 8 shows the number
of bugs found by V-Fuzz and VUzzer. Each injected bug
in LAVA-M has a unique ID, and the corresponding ID is
printed when the bug is triggered. There are two kinds of
bugs in LAVA-M: listed and unlisted. The listed bugs are
those that the LAVA-M authors were able to trigger when
creating the LAVA-M programs, and the unlisted bugs are
those that the LAVA-M authors were not able to trigger.
From Table 8, we can observe that V-Fuzz can trigger more
bugs than VUzzer. In addition, V-Fuzz is able to trigger
several unlisted bugs and exhibits a better performance than
VUzzer in this case too. Table 7 shows the IDs of bugs
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Fig. 12: The growth curves of the number of unique crashes.
TABLE 7: The IDs of bugs triggered by V-Fuzz on LAVA-M.
Application IDs of Bugs
uniq 112, 130, 166, 169, 170, 171, 215, 222, 227, 293, 296297, 321, 322, 346, 347, 368, 371, 372, 393, 396
397, 443, 446, 447, 468, 471, 472
base64 1, 222, 235, 253, 255, 274, 276, 278, 284, 386, 521, 526556, 558, 562, 576, 583, 584, 784, 790, 804, 805, 806, 813
832, 841, 843
who
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14, 20, 22, 24, 56, 58, 60, 62, 75
77, 79, 81, 83, 87, 89, 109, 116, 124, 127, 129, 131
133, 137, 139, 143, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 161
177, 179, 197, 1151, 1171, 1250, 1272, 1276, 1280, 1291
1721, 1783, 1880, 1888, 1908, 2486, 2947, 2957, 2979
3201, 3240, 3780, 3923, 3979
triggered by V-Fuzz on three programs (uniq, base64 and
who) of LAVA-M datasets.
For the real-world Linux applications, in order to ver-
ify the vulnerabilities found by V-Fuzz, we recompile the
fuzzed programs with AddressSanitizer [18], which is a
memory error detector for C/C++ programs. Then, we
execute these programs with the collected crash inputs.
AddressSanitizer can give the detailed information of the
vulnerabilities. Based on the information from AddressSan-
itizer, we search the related information on the official CVE
website [19] and validate the vulnerabilities we found.
Table 9 shows the detailed CVE information that we
found. We have found 10 CVEs in total, which 3 of them
(CVE-2018-10767, CVE-2018-10733 and CVE-2018-10768) are
newly found by us. Moreover, most of the fuzzed appli-
cations are shown to have CVEs. The crash inputs which
are found when fuzzing the programs of xpdf-2.0 can
also trigger the vulnerability of xpdf-3.01. Finally, most
of the CVEs are buffer related errors, which is reasonable as
fuzzing test is good at finding this type of vulnerabilities.
TABLE 8: The number of bugs found on LAVA-M.
Application V-Fuzz VUzzerListed Unlisted Total Listed Unlisted Total
uniq 27 1 28 26 1 27
base64 24 3 27 23 2 25
who 57 9 62 52 7 59
7.2.3 Code Coverage
V-Fuzz is neither a coverage-based fuzzer nor a directed
fuzzer. The goal of V-Fuzz is to find more bugs in a shorter
period of time. In this part, we show that V-Fuzz can achieve
its goal without decreasing its code coverage. The methods
of calculating the code coverage for different fuzzers are
different. AFL and AFLFast utilize the static instrumentation
with a compact bitmap to track edge coverage, VUzzer
leverages the dynamic binary instrumentation tool PIN [24]
to track basic block coverage. Additionally, as [63] indicated,
most of the fuzzers cannot calculate code coverage accu-
rately. Therefore, for evaluating the code coverage, we only
compare V-Fuzz with VUzzer as they leverage the same
approach to calculate the basic block coverage.
Figure 13 shows the growth curves of the code coverage
within 24 hours for V-Fuzz and VUzzer. From this figure,
we have the following observations: (1) For most of the pro-
grams, the code coverage of V-Fuzz and VUzzer is almost
the same. (2) There is only one program (mpg321), on which
the code coverage covered of VUzzer(19%) is slightly larger
than V-Fuzz(17%). (3) There are several programs (e.g.,
MP3Gain), on which V-Fuzz has a higher code coverage,
especially for the program xpstops.
In conclusion, although the code coverage is not the
main objective that V-Fuzz focuses on, the experiments
show that V-Fuzz can achieve its main goal of finding
crashes without decreasing much code coverage. Moreover,
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TABLE 9: The CVEs found by V-Fuzz.
Application Version CVE Vulnerability Typye
pdftotext
xpdf<=3.01 CVE-2007-0104 Buffer errorspdffonts
pdftopbm
mpg321 0.3.2 CVE-2017-11552 Buffer errors
MP3Gain 1.5.2
CVE-2017-14406 NULL pointer dereference
CVE-2017-14407 Stack-based buffer over-read
CVE-2017-14409 Buffer overflow
CVE-2017-14410 Buffer over-read
CVE-2017-12912 Buffer errors
libgxps <=0.3.0 CVE-2018-10767 (new) Buffer errorsCVE-2018-10733 (new) Stack-based buffer over-read
libpoppler 0.24.5 CVE-2018-10768 (new) NULL pointer dereference
it can help reduce the false negative of the vulnerability
prediction model.
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Vulnerability-Oriented Fuzzing
The blindness of fuzzing can be decreased by providing
it with more information or combine fuzzing with other
techniques. For example, Driller [43] is a popular fuzzer
which combines fuzzing with symbolic execution tech-
niques. When the fuzzer got ”stuck”, the symbolic execution
can compute a valid input for it. However, as symbolic
execution does not work well for real programs, it is hard to
apply this idea to real world.
The idea of vulnerability-oriented fuzzing is to improve
a fuzzer’s efficiency of finding vulnerabilities by assisting
it with static vulnerability analysis techniques. The static
vulnerability analysis can provide a fuzzer with more in-
formation, which can reduce the blindness of it. It is worth
noting that static vulnerability analysis can be conducted
by traditional static vulnerability detection tools or AI
techniques (e.g., deep learning or machine learning) based
models. Therefore, the vulnerability-oriented fuzzing can be
implemented by many static analysis techniques. In addi-
tion, the static analysis just gives an auxiliary information
to a fuzzer, which does not affect its extensibility.
Most of static analysis tools or models suffer from high
false positive or false negative. This problem has been
plaguing the security researchers for many years, and there
has been no good solution to solve it yet. However, static
analysis can be combined with fuzzing to reduce its weak-
ness. Moreover, unlike combining fuzzing with symbolic
execution, it has better extensibility and effectiveness.
8.2 Limitations and Future Works
Although V-Fuzz has improved the capability of fuzzing test
in detecting vulnerabilities, it still has several limitations.
First, we only use the dataset from NIST [13] to train and
test the vulnerability prediction model. The number of the
labeled samples may not be sufficient, which might further
affect the performance of the model. In the future, we
will pay more attention to collect and label more data to
improve the model. Second, our model is mainly designed
for binary programs. Although the model for predicting
vulnerabilities for binary programs might be difficult than
for source codes, it is also necessary to design a model which
can be applied to source codes directly. In addition, as the
instrumentation methods of most state-of-the-art fuzzers are
based on compilers (e.g., gcc or clang), they need the source
code of the fuzzed programs. In order to combine our model
with these fuzzers conveniently, we will study source-code
based prediction models, and combine these models with
more state-of-the-art fuzzers in the future.
9 RELATED WORK
We introduce the related work from two perspectives: vul-
nerability prediction and fuzzing test.
9.1 Vulnerability Prediction
Here we introduce the related work about vulnerability
prediction. It needs to be emphasized that most of the
previous work on vulnerability prediction is dealing with
source code, which is different from us as we deal with
binaries.
9.1.1 Machine Learning based Vulnerability Prediction
Machine learning based vulnerability prediction models
are designed based on some software features which are
manually selected or constructed by the experts. Shin et
al. [70] leveraged complexity, code churn, and developer
activity metrics to discriminate between vulnerable and
neutral files. Hovsepyan et al. [71] presented a novel ap-
proach for vulnerability prediction that leverages on the
analysis of raw source code as text. Gegick et al. [72]
designed an attack-prone prediction model with some code-
level metrics: static analysis tool alert density, code churn
and count of the lines of code. Neuhaus et al. [73] proposed
an approach to mine existing vulnerability databases and
version archives automatically to map past vulnerabilities
to components. Shar et al. [74] leveraged some static and
dynamic attributes to predict the SQL injection and cross
site scripting vulnerabilities. Walden et al. [75] examined
vulnerability prediction models for web applications, and
compared the performance of prediction models based on
softwares metrics with that of models based on text mining.
14
Fig. 13: Code coverage rate.
9.1.2 Deep Learning based Vulnerability Prediction
Machine learning based approaches focus on manually de-
signing features to represent a program. However, these
approaches still need too much energy. Therefore, some
deep learning based vulnerability prediction models are
proposed. One of the biggest advantages of these models
is the deep learning based models can learn features au-
tomatically according to different types of programs. Dam
et al. [76] described a new approach built upon the Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) model to automatically learn
both semantic and syntactic features in code. Wang et al.
[77] leveraged Deep Belief Network (DBN) to automatically
learn semantic representation of programs from source code.
Yang et al. [38] leveraged deep learning techniques to learn
features for defect prediction. Dam et al. [78] presented an
end-to-end generic framework based on LSTM for modeling
software and its development process to predict future risks.
White et al. [39] demonstrated that the deep software lan-
guage models have better performance than n-grams based
models. Gu et al. [79] proposed a deep learning based ap-
proach to generate API usage sequences for a given natural
language query. Huo et al. [80] proposed a convolutional
neural network based model to learn unified features from
natural language and source code in programs for locating
the potential buggy source code.
9.2 Fuzzing Test
9.2.1 Symbolic Execution based Fuzzing.
Most of whitebox fuzzers leverage symbolic execution or
concolic execution (combines symbolic execution and con-
crete execution) to generate inputs that can execute new
paths. SAGE [26] is a whitebox fuzzer, which uses symbolic
execution to gather path constraints of conditional state-
ments. CUTE [25] is a unit testing engine for C programs
by combining symbolic and concrete execution. ZESTI [31]
is a software testing tool that takes a lightweight symbolic
execution mechanism to execute regression test. Dowser [33]
is a guided fuzzer that combines taint tracking, program
analysis and symbolic execution to detect buffer overflow
vulnerabilities. Driller [43] combines AFL with concolic
execution to generate inputs that can trigger deeper bugs.
SmartFuzz [28] focuses on discovering integer bugs for x86
binaries using symbolic execution.
9.2.2 Taint Analysis based Fuzzing.
Another common technique that is leveraged by fuzzing is
taint analysis, especially dynamic taint analysis. BuzzFuzz
[27] is an automated whitebox fuzzer. It employs dynamic
taint tracing to locate the regions of the original inputs that
influence values used at key attack points. TaintScope [29]
is a fuzzing system that uses dynamic taint analysis and
symbolic execution to fuzz x86 binary programs.
9.2.3 Heuristic Algorithm based Fuzzing.
Most mutation-based fuzzers employ heuristic algorithms
such as evolutionary algorithms to guide them select and
generate high-quality inputs. AFL [9] is the most popu-
lar mutation-based fuzzer which leverages a simple evo-
lutionary algorithm to generate inputs. AFLFast [48] is
a coverage-based greybox fuzzer. It leverages a Markov
chain model to generate inputs that tends to arrive at the
“low-frequency” paths. VUzzer [57] is an application-aware
fuzzer. It leverages an evolutionary algorithm to generate
inputs that can discover bugs in deep paths. AFLGo [53]
is a directed greybox fuzzer, which generates inputs with
the aim of reaching some specific locations by a simulated
annealing-based power schedule approach. SlowFuzz [55] is
a domain-independent framework for automatically finding
algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities.
9.2.4 Machine Learning based Fuzzing.
With the development of artificial intelligence techniques,
there are some researches that begin to explore how to
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apply these techniques into fuzzing test. Godefroid et al.
[59] propose a novel fuzzing method, which uses a learnt
input probability distribution to intelligently guide where
to fuzz inputs. Rajpal et al. [60] present a learning approach
that uses neural networks to learn patterns in the inputs
files to guide future fuzzing. Nichols et al. [61] propose a
method that uses Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
models to reinitialize the seed files to improve the perfor-
mance of fuzzing. This paper [66] formalizes fuzzing as
a reinforcement learning problem by using the concept of
Markov decision process.
9.2.5 Other Fuzzing Researches.
kAFL [50] is a hardware-assisted feedback fuzzer that fo-
cuses on fuzzing x86-64 kernels. IMF [52] leverages inferred
dependence model to fuzz commodity OS kernels. Skyfire
[51] leverages the knowledge of existing samples to gen-
erate well-distributed inputs for fuzzing. CollAFL [63] is
a coverage sensitive fuzzing solution that mitigates path
collisions by improving the accurate coverage information.
T-Fuzz [62] leverages a lightweight dynamic tracing-based
approach to infer all checks that could not be passed and
generates mutated programs where the checks are negated.
Angora [64] is an mutation-based fuzzer that increases
branch coverage by solving path constraints without sym-
bolic execution.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design and implement V-Fuzz, a
vulnerability-oriented evolutionary fuzzing framework. By
combining the vulnerability prediction with evolutionary
fuzzing, V-Fuzz can generate inputs that tend to arrive at the
potential vulnerable regions. We evaluate V-Fuzz on popu-
lar benchmark programs (e.g., uniq) of LAVA-M [45], and a
variety of real-world Linux applications including the audio
processing softwares (e.g., MP3Gain), pdf transformation
tools (e.g., pdftotext) and xps documents library (e.g.,
libgxps). Compared with the state-of-the-art fuzzers, the
experimental results demonstrate that V-Fuzz can find more
vulnerabilities quickly. In addition, V-Fuzz has discovered
10 CVEs, and 3 of them are newly discovered. We reported
the new CVEs, and they have been confirmed and fixed.
In the future, we will study to leverage more advanced
program analysis techniques to assist fuzzer in discovering
vulnerabilities.
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